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  Abstract  
 
 
Recent research in both the social and natural sciences has been devoted to increasing our 
ability to predict disasters, prepare for them and mitigate their costs. Curiously, we appear 
to know very little about the fiscal consequences of disasters. The likely fiscal impact of a 
natural disaster has not been examined before in any comparable or comparative 
framework. We estimate and quantify the fiscal consequences of natural disasters using 
quarterly fiscal and disaster data for a large panel of countries. In our estimations, we 
employ a panel VAR framework that is similar to Burnside et al. (Journal of Economic 
Theory, 2004), that also controls for the business cycle. We find fiscal behavior in the 
aftermath of disasters in developed countries that can best be characterized as counter-
cyclical. In contrast, we find pro-cyclical decreased spending and increasing revenues in 
developing countries following large natural disasters. We quantify these effects. 
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The canton of Unterwald in Switzerland is frequently ravaged by 
storms and inundations, and is thereby exposed to extraordinary 
expences. Upon such occasions the people assemble, and every 
one is said to declare with the greatest frankness what he is worth in 
order to be taxed accordingly.  
(from The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith,  book V  
chapter II) 
1.  Introduction 
  Natural disasters have resulted in significant economic and human loss 
long before Adam Smith wrote about the Unterwald. Major catastrophic 
events—recently the Indian Ocean tsunami, the Kashmir and Sichuan 
earthquakes and Hurricane Katrina—repeatedly bring the human and material 
cost of these crises to the forefront of public attention worldwide. Natural 
disasters also figure prominently in controversial discussions about global 
warming, especially in relation to the attendant changes in the patterns of 
climatic events and sea levels that are predicted to accompany such warming 
(IPCC, 2007).1 The United Nation’s Integrated Regional Information Network 
notes, “Over the past decade, the total [number of people] affected by natural 
disasters has tripled to 2 billion.” (IRIN, 2005). Therefore, much research in both 
the social and natural sciences has been devoted to increasing our ability to 
predict disasters, prepare for them and mitigate their costs. Curiously, we are 
unaware of any research that attempts to quantify the impact of natural 
disasters on the public purse. We appear to know very little about the typical 
fiscal consequences of disasters. 
                                                  
1 Increasing levels of greenhouse gases, changing sea, land and air temperatures, rising sea 
levels, changing patterns of rain and snow and an unstable climate are all likely catalysts of 
future events.  3 
 
In developing the EM-DAT international database on disasters, a 
significant research effort has gone into measuring the primary costs of disasters 
in terms of human lives lost, the number of people directly affected, and the 
damage to property and infrastructure. In a recent emerging literature, several 
papers have used this data to examine the determinants of these economic 
costs (Anbarci et al., 2005; Kahn, 2004; Raschky, 2008; and Skidmore and Toya, 
2007). Some further work has estimated the short- and long-run secondary 
impacts of disaster on production, productivity and output (Cavallo and Noy, 
2008; Cuaresma et al., 2008; Noy, 2009; and Skidmore and Toya, 2002). However, 
the likely fiscal impact of a natural disaster has not been examined before in 
any comparable or comparative framework.  
On the expenditure side, the disaster reconstruction costs to the public 
may be very different than the original magnitude of destruction of capital that 
occurred. For example, the cost for delivering and supplying populations with 
both short-term survival needs and longer term reconstruction may be fraught 
with logistical expenses and can also lead to other macroeconomic dynamics 
that will have an adverse impact on the government’s fiscal spending. On the 
other hand, it is also possible that the added reconstruction costs be lower, 
especially if much of the capital that was destroyed is no longer necessary, was 
anyway becoming obsolete, is cheaper to replace or because of wide-scale 
loss of life. In such cases, the fiscal spending burden may potentially be smaller 
(see Fengler et al., 2008 for more detail on these possibilities).  
On the other side of the fiscal ledger, the impact of disasters on tax and 
other revenue sources has also not been quantitatively examined. To a large 
extent, impacts on revenue depend on the macroeconomic dynamics 
occurring following the disaster shock, and the structure of revenue sources 
(income taxes, consumption taxes, custom dues, etc.) since each may react 
differently in the aftermath of the disaster event. 4 
 
Obtaining accurate estimates of the likely fiscal costs of a disaster is useful 
in enabling better cost-benefit evaluation of various mitigation programs. These 
should also assist foreign aid organizations and international multilateral 
institutions in planning and preparing their programs. Another motivation to 
estimate the fiscal cost is to better enable governments to directly insure against 
disaster losses, indirectly through the issuance of catastrophic bonds (CAT 
bonds), or through precautionary saving.2 The only attempt we know of 
estimating the likely fiscal insurance needs of a government has been 
calculated for Belize (Borensztein et al., 2008); though whether these estimates 
for Belize apply elsewhere is an unexplored question. 
We estimate the fiscal consequences of natural disasters using quarterly 
fiscal data for a large panel of countries. In our estimations, we employ a panel 
VAR framework that also controls for the business cycle. We find fiscal behavior 
in the aftermath of disasters in developed countries that can be characterized 
as counter-cyclical,  but pro-cyclical decreased spending and increasing 
revenues in developing countries following large natural disasters. 
 
2.  Data 
Our dataset includes 22 developed and 20 developing countries; only 
data availability restricted our sample (see the appendix for a list of countries). 
We collected quarterly data on natural disasters and government finance for 
the period from 1990 to 2005. The natural disaster data is extracted from the EM-
DAT database collected by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of 
Disasters (CRED).3 The EM-DAT database provides information on worldwide 
disasters compiled from various sources, including UN agencies, non-
                                                  
2 Barnichon (2008) calculates the optimal amount of international reserves for a country facing 
external disaster shocks using a calibrated model. 
3 CRED is based at the Catholic University of Louvain in Belgium. The EM-DAT data is publicly 
available on CRED’s web site at: www.cred.be/ 5 
 
governmental organizations, insurance companies, research institutions and 
press agencies. Disasters reported in the database include hydro-
meteorological disasters (floods, wave surges, storms, droughts, landslides and 
avalanches), geophysical disasters (earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic 
eruptions), and biological disasters (epidemics and insect infestations). CRED 
defines a disaster as a natural situation or event which overwhelms local 
capacity necessitating a request for external assistance. Specifically, at least 
one of the four criteria must be fulfilled: (1) 10 or more people reported killed; (2) 
100 people reported affected; (3) declaration of a state of emergency; or (4) 
call for international assistance.4   
We construct a series of standardized quarterly disaster variables which 
reflect the magnitude of these disasters. We aggregate the amount of direct 
damage from disaster events reported in the EM-DAT database for a country in 
a given quarter, and then divided by country’s GDP from the same quarter of 
previous year to facilitate cross-country comparisons.5  The data on quarterly 
GDP comes from the International Finance Statistics (IFS) database provided by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF).6  
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of our disaster variable. It seems very 
likely that the financial cost of disaster relates to the level of development. Over 
the period from 1990-2005, the average damage amount from disasters is more 
than three times higher in developing countries than in developed countries 
                                                  
4 The number of people killed includes “persons confirmed as dead and persons missing and 
presumed dead”; people affected are those “requiring immediate assistance during a period of 
emergency, i.e. requiring basic survival needs such as food, water, shelter, sanitation and 
immediate medical assistance.” 
5 Note that we do not use current GDP to standardize the disaster damage since the current 
GDP has been affected by the disaster itself.  
6 From the outset, it should be clear that doubts have been expressed about the accuracy of 
data on natural disasters; especially because often the major source of these data (national 
governments) has an interest in inflating the measured impact. Yet, since biases should by 
consistent, using data from one source should provide information about the relative magnitude 
of disasters and should thus be appropriate for the hypotheses we examine here, and for our 
empirical predictions regarding an average disaster’s likely impact. 6 
 
(1.095 vs. 0.309). This result is widely reported in the literature, with most 
explanations emphasizing the capacity of rich nations to better prepare and 
mitigate the cost of disasters. 
 
Table 1.  Summary Statistics of Disaster Variable 
 
Sample Countries  Obs  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Max 
Developed countries  22  1408  0.309  0.735 5.921 
Developing countries  20  1251  1.095  3.033 29.179 
   Upper Middle Income  11  690  0.799  2.164 11.322 
   Lower Middle Income  9  561  1.257  3.413 29.179 
Notes: See the appendix for list of countries.  Means and standard deviations are 
computed from disaster episodes only; number of observations denotes the total 
number of quarterly observations we obtain for each sample, including ‘no 
disaster’ observations. 
 
Data on fiscal policy is primarily taken from the section on government 
finances in the IFS database (this data was supplemented by data from the 
Government Finance Statistics CD-ROM, also available from the IMF). The 
government finance data includes cash flows of the budgetary central 
government (the Statement of Sources and Uses of Cash) and/or accrual flows 
of the consolidated general government (the Statement of Government 
Operations). The two statements broadly correspond to each other, but with 
variation in the terminology used. In the analysis, we examine five fiscal 
variables: government consumption (govcon); government revenue (govrev); 
government payment (govpay); government cash surplus (govsurp); and 
government outstanding debt (govdebt). We remove seasonal effects using the 
X12 seasonal adjustment method and present the data as percent of GDP.  
Government consumption (line 91f, IFS) consists of consumption 
expenditure incurred by general government.  The government revenue (line c1 
/or a1, IFS) consists of four main components: taxes; social contribution; grants; 
and other receipts. The government payment (line c2 /or a2,IFS) includes 
compensation of employees, purchase of goods and services, consumption of 7 
 
fixed capital, interest payment, subsidies, grants, social benefits, and other 
payments. The government cash surplus or government net lending (line ccsd, 
/or anlb, IFS) is the net result of the net cash balance or net operating balance 
and the net acquisition of nonfinancial assets. The government outstanding 
debt (line c63 /or a63, IFS) refers to the direct and assumed debt of the 
reporting level of government.  
Table 2 displays the main descriptive statistics of the fiscal variables. The 
size of government is clearly larger in developed countries. However, upper-
middle income countries have on average lower fiscal deficits than developed 
countries while the lower-middle income countries have the largest average 
deficits (the sample mean of govsurp = -2.3% of GDP).  Notice that the 
outstanding debt variable contains substantially fewer observations, and should 
be interpreted with caution. In addition, though the government debt is usually 
stated in percent of annual GDP, the debt data presented here is divided by 
quarterly GDP.  
 




Sample Cou  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.   Min Max 
govco
n 
Developed 22  1352  19.498  4.048 10.956 29.785 
  Developing 20  1052  14.635  5.648 5.452  35.181 
  Upper Middle Inc.  11  596  16.832  5.871 7.796  35.181 
  Lower  Middle 
Inc. 
9  456  11.763  3.746 5.452  23.335 
            
govrev  Developed 20  843  23.489  13.945 3.339  59.351 
  Developing 17  745  17.219  10.208 2.579  68.503 
  Upper  Middle 
Inc. 
9  388  17.271  13.292 2.964  68.503 
   Lower Middle 
Inc. 
8  357  17.162  5.070 2.579  34.991 
            
govpa
y 
Developed 20  872  25.657  14.681 1.932  57.033 
  Developing 17  737  18.329  10.428 2.470  53.917 8 
 
  Upper Middle Inc.  9  380  17.441  13.358 2.470  53.917 
   Lower Middle 
Inc. 
8  357  19.273  5.757 2.617  36.006 
            
govsur
p 
Developed 20  902  -1.122  4.279 -
21.220 
18.760 
  Developing 16  745  -1.292  3.414 -
17.844 
18.726 
     Upper Middle 
Inc. 
8  388  -0.359  3.614 -17.844  18.726 
  Lower Middle Inc.  8  357  -2.307  2.859 -13.717  10.039 
            
govde
bt 
Developed 11  628  37.012  20.553 1.664  75.396 
  Developing 7  300  23.471  19.381 1.466  74.069 
  Upper Middle Inc.  5  236  26.157  20.376 5.329  74.069 
   Lower Middle 
Inc. 
2  64  13.568  10.366 1.466  30.156 
 
3.  Methodology 
Eichenbaum and Fisher (2005) estimate the impact of the 9/11/2001 
terrorist attacks on the U.S. government’s fiscal accounts.  Our aim in this paper 
is similar to theirs; we would like to describe the typical fiscal policy response 
following a large exogenous shock, a natural disaster, in a panel of developed 
and developing countries. In terms of the methodology we use, this paper is 
closest to Burnside et al. (2004) that described macroeconomic developments 
in the United States following three large exogenous fiscal shocks. The shocks 
they identify are the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Carter-Reagan 
military build-up.  In their work, they use a VAR methodology that is in principle 
identical to ours; though our use of a panel necessitates a different estimation 
procedure.7 
We estimate a panel vector autoregression (PVAR) model and the 
corresponding impulse-response functions. The reduced form equation is:  
                                                  
7 Two other examples of a VAR estimation with fiscal data but in different contexts  are 









=Φ + Φ + + + ∑ , x x αλe                                                                                         
(1) 
where   is a two-variable vector: {disaster, fiscal},  , it x i α  is a vector of country-
specific effects,  t λ is a vector of time-effects, and  is an i.i.d. disturbance 
vector. Specifically, the bivariate vector {disaster, fiscal} encompasses five 
model specifications that correspond with the five fiscal variables we examine: 
government consumption, revenue, payments, surplus and debt. 
, it e
As suggested in Love and Zicchino (2006), the original variables are time-
demeaned and the fixed-individual effects are removed by Helmert 
transformation method.8 We test for stationarity by implementing a number of 
panel unit root tests. The test results are reported in Table 3A and 3B; in all cases 
we clearly reject the unit root null. The model is estimated using a generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimation with untransformed variables used as 
instruments for transformed variables. Numerical impulse-response is computed 
from the estimated PVAR coefficients. We perform the Monte Carlo simulation to 
the estimated standard errors to generate 10th and 90th percentiles of the 
distribution which will be used as a confidence interval of the impulse-response. 
The number of repetition is 1000 times.  
 
Table 3A.  Panel Unit Root Test Results: Developed Countries 
 
Null Hypothesis: Unit Root. 
Variable IPS  ADF-Fisher  PP-Fisher 





dam -30.521  0.000  726.104  0.000  956.318 0.000 
govcon -3.816  0.000  84.909  0.000  102.631 0.000 
govrev -3.205  0.001  79.429  0.000  139.665 0.000 
govpay -4.211  0.000  95.005  0.000  137.100 0.000 
                                                  
8 The procedure implements forward mean-differencing which preserves the orthogonality 
between transformed and untransformed variables. 10 
 
govsurp -7.616  0.000  166.438  0.000  278.033 0.000 
govdebt -2.354  0.009  56.629  0.005  56.106 0.005 
Notes: (1) Variables shown are transformed variables using  time-demeaned and Helmert 
fixed-effects transformation methods. (2) Lag length selection is based on AIC criteria. (3) IPS 
test is the test proposed by Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003),  (4) ADF-Fisher, and PP-Fisher tests are 
Fisher-type tests using ADF and PP proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999). (5) The test results for 
time-demeaned variables (without Helmert) are not shown here. However, we find that all the 
three tests reject the unit root for the disaster variable.  The PP-Fisher test results reject the unit 
root for all fiscal variables, while the IPS and the ADF-Fisher test results fail to reject the unit root 
for govcon, govrev, govpay, and govdebt.  
 11 
 
Table 3B.  Panel Unit Root Test Results: Developing Countries 
 
Null Hypothesis: Unit Root. 
Variable IPS  ADF-Fisher PP-Fisher 





dam -21.004  0.000  473.224  0.000  565.735 0.000 
govcon -5.863  0.000  125.510  0.000  138.972 0.000 
govrev -4.323  0.000  91.089  0.000  107.095 0.000 
govpay -4.924  0.000  89.935  0.000  146.984 0.000 
govsurp -9.566  0.000  177.025  0.000  282.540 0.000 
govdebt -1.802  0.036  28.986  0.011  29.160 0.010 
Notes: (1) Variables shown are transformed variables using  time-demeaned and Helmert 
fixed-effects transformation methods. (2) Lag length selection is based on AIC criteria. (3) IPS 
test is the test proposed by Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003),  (4) ADF-Fisher, and PP-Fisher tests 
are Fisher-type tests using ADF and PP proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999). (5) The test 
results for time-demeaned variables (without Helmert) are not shown here. However, we find 
that the PP-Fisher test results reject the unit root for all variables, while the IPS and the ADF-
Fisher test results fail to reject the unit root for govdebt.  
 
4.  Results 
  Figures 1A and 1B show impulse-response dynamics of a disaster shock on 
the fiscal variables for developed and developing countries from the baseline 
model as specified in equation (1). We set the magnitude of the disaster shock 
to two standard deviations because we want to examine the impact of large 
scale disasters.  We summarize the cumulative fiscal impact of a large (2 STD) 
natural disaster over the first six quarters in Table 4A and 4B.  
For developed countries, we find that the government consumption ratio 
rises on impact (0.04 % of GDP) and gradually declines thereafter. The 
government revenue drops immediately (-1.27 % of GDP) with negative 
cumulative impact, despite some improvements over time. The government 
payment, on the other hand, increases on impact (0.46% of GDP) reaching its 
peak in the third quarter. The government cash surplus is negative on impact 
which is equivalent to being a net borrower (-0.28 % of GDP) and continually 
getting worse. Finally, the government outstanding debt increases following the 12 
 
shock (1.07% of GDP), accumulating more than 8% of GDP over a year and a 
half.    13 
 
Table 4A.  Cumulative Impact: Developed Countries 
 






From the baseline model with 4 lags. 
    
The dynamic responses of developing countries are quite different from 
those of developed countries. Developing countries pursue a largely pro-
cyclical fiscal policy following a large natural disaster shock. On impact, 
government consumption, government revenue, government payment, and 
outstanding debt response negatively, whereas the government cash surplus 
increases.  The cumulative impact shown in Table 4B below emphasizes this 
surprising pro-cyclical behavior even more. The cumulative government 
consumption expenditure and government payment decline (-0.68% and -0.33% 
of GDP), government revenue and cash surplus rise (4.23% and 2.79% of GDP), 
and outstanding debt decreases (-0.72% of GDP).9 
Table 4B.  Cumulative Impact: Developing Countries 
 






From the baseline model with 4 lags. 
 
5.  Robustness 
                                                  
9 This finding of pro-cyclical fiscal policy in developing countries is corroborated by Ilzetzki and 
Végh (2008). They do not examine natural disasters, but demonstrate that unlike developed 
countries, developing countries follow a pro-cyclical fiscal policy in their reaction to business 
cycle changes. 14 
 
In the baseline model, we estimate the PVAR model using four lags based on 
the AIC (with quarterly data). In this section, we expand the lag length to six and 
eight lags, to generate the corresponding impulse-response function and 
cumulative impact.  For both sub-samples, results are to a large extent robust 
and similar to the four lags estimations. However, for the developed countries 
sample, estimates of the cumulative impact on revenues appears to be sensitive 
to the number of lags used, while for the developing countries sample, results for 
payments are apparently not robust. The impulse-response graphs from a model 
with eight lags are shown in Figure 2A and 2B, and their cumulative impacts are 
reported in Table 5A and 5B.10  
 
Table 5A.  Cumulative Impact: Developed Countries 
 
Variable  6-lag   8-lag  
govcon -0.114  -0.081 
govrev -4.367  1.682 
govpay 1.588  1.780 
govsurp -1.551  -1.570 
govdebt 5.077  5.606 
From the model with 6 or 8 lags. 
 
 
Table 5B.  Cumulative Impact: Developing Countries 
 
Variable  6-lag   8-lag  
govcon -0.978  -0.535 
govrev 4.508  3.669 
govpay 1.857  -3.250 
govsurp 2.039  2.070 
govdebt -3.219  -2.777 
From the model with 6 or 8 lags. 
 
  In addition, we split the developing countries subsample into upper-
middle income and lower-middle income countries. Figure 3A and 3B show their 
impulse-response graphs and Table 6A and 6B report their cumulative impacts. 
                                                  
10 To save space, we do not show the impulse-response graphs from the model with 6 lags; 
though they are very similar. Results are available from the authors upon request. 15 
 
We find that in the cumulative impact, pro-cyclical fiscal policy is to large extent 
stronger in the lower-income developing countries, suggesting a decreasing 
ability to use fiscal policy to withstand external negative shocks that is 
associated with lower income.  16 
 
Table 6A.  Cumulative Impact: Upper-Middle Income Countries 






From the baseline model with 4 lags. 
 
Table 6B.  Cumulative Impact: Lower-Middle Income Countries 






From the baseline model with 4 lags. 
 
6.  Fiscal projections for 2 prototypical cases  
One of the purposes for this work is to equip policy makers with an estimate 
of the likely impact of a large natural disaster on their government accounts. 
Since different countries have different vulnerabilities to disasters—both in terms 
of occurrence probabilities, and the different disaster scales, we calculate for 
several countries the average magnitude of a 2-standard-deviations disaster 
and from that calculate the disaster’s likely fiscal impact. The disaster data for 
specific countries are presented in table 7 while the cumulative fiscal impacts 
are presented in table 8. 




Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Developed countries:           
USA 59  0.059  0.173  0.000 1.197 
Germany 19  0.289  0.632  0.002 2.483 
Upper-middle income 
countries: 
         
Mexico 19  0.093  0.136  0.001 0.496 
South Africa  8  0.076  0.140  0.000 0.411 
Lower-middle income 
countries: 
         17 
 
Indonesia 24  1.701  6.042  0.004 29.179 
Philippines 41  0.904  2.009  0.001 8.371 
                Notes: All statistics are calculated from disaster episodes. 
 
 
Table 8 provides us with the magnitude of the estimated fiscal effects for 
several countries. These estimates are based on the regression results presented 
in tables 4A, 6A and 6B. The table clearly demonstrates that while our empirical 
exercise was aimed at estimating the average effect of a disaster on fiscal 
variables, the actual magnitude of the estimated effects are different across 
different countries as these countries face different disaster probabilities and 
different distributions of the disaster magnitude.  
Table 8.  Cumulative Impacts – Selected Countries 
 
Variable  USA Germany  Mexico  S. Africa  Indonesia Philippines 
govcon -0.027  -0.096  0.008  0.009  -1.660 -0.553 
govrev -0.695  -2.491  0.236  0.276  -4.135 -1.378 
govpay 0.571  2.045  -0.250  -0.292  -11.707 -3.902 
govsurp -0.499  -1.787  0.174  0.203  3.395 1.132 
govdebt 1.942 6.960  -0.144  -0.168  N/A N/A 
From the baseline model with 4 lags. 
 
7.  Policy conclusions 
We estimated the fiscal consequences of natural disasters using quarterly 
fiscal data for a panel of 22 developed and 20 developing countries for 1990-
2005 using VARs, as in Burnside et al. (2004). In our estimations, we employ a 
panel VAR framework that also controls for the business cycle and was 
developed by Love and Zicchino (2006). We find fiscal behavior in the aftermath 
of disasters to be different between developed and developing countries. In 
developed countries, governments seem to be ‘leaning against the wind’ and 
increasing spending and cutting taxes following a large disaster event. On the 
other hand, fiscal policy in developing countries can best be described as pro-
cyclical; with governments largely decreasing spending and increasing 
revenues in the aftermath of large natural disaster events. 18 
 
While we cannot conclude anything about the reasons behind this 
differentiated behavior, we observe that this counter-intuitive pro-cyclical fiscal 
policy in developing countries is well documented in other contexts, most 
recently by Ilzetzki and Végh (2008). These findings suggest an extra urgency to 
develop insurance mechanisms that will enable governments to insure against 
these adverse fiscal consequences. This need is especially acute in developing 
countries, since the pro-cyclical policy adopted in the aftermath of the disaster 
leads to further and deeper adverse macro-economic outcomes as a result of 
these events. 
Our quantitative results suggest the exact amount of coverage that 
governments need to accumulate to insure against these adverse outcomes. 
For example, given the results we present in table 8, we suggest that given past 
experiences, the Indonesian government should insure itself, perhaps through 
the issuance of CAT bonds, to a larger extent than the Philippine government. 
These are preliminary results, and while suggestive, a mechanism to measure 
more precisely the amount of insurance needed to account for both the 
occasional large scale disaster together with frequent smaller disasters needs to 
be developed. 
Once we obtain a benchmark for the likely fiscal dynamics after a disaster 
event, we can also start to examine the determinants of these effects. For 
example, different public response to disaster damage may depend on the 
government accountability to the electorate; i.e., more democratic and 
competitive regimes with freer speech/press and more transparent institutions 
are likely to respond more aggressively to disasters than countries whose 
governments are not responsive or accountable to the population. Besley and 
Burgess (2002) and before them Sen (1980) suggest several hypotheses that can 
potentially be examined with more detailed fiscal and disaster data, or data at 
the sub-national level.  19 
 
  
Figure 1A. Selected Impulse-Response Graphs from the Baseline Model for 
Developed Countries (Two-Standard-Deviation Disaster Shock) 
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Figure 1B. Selected Impulse-Response Graphs from the Baseline Model for 
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Figure 2A. Selected Impulse-Response Graphs from the Model with 8 Lags 
for Developed Countries (Two-Standard-Deviation Disaster Shock) 
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 Figure 2B. Selected Impulse-Response Graphs from the Model with 8 Lags 
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Figure 3A. Selected Impulse-Response Graphs from the Baseline Model for 
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Figure 3B. Impulse-Response Graphs from the Baseline Model for Lower-
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Appendix: List of Countries 





Australia Argentina  Bolivia 
Austria Botswana  Colombia 
Belgium Brazil  Ecuador 
Canada Chile  Guatemala 
Denmark Cyprus  Indonesia 
Finland Israel  Iran 
France Malaysia  Peru 
Germany Mexico  Philippines 
Iceland Poland  Thailand 
Ireland South  Africa   
Italy Turkey   
Japan    
Korea    
Netherlands    
New Zealand     
Norway    
Portugal    
Spain    
Sweden    
Switzerland    
United Kingdom     
United States     
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